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ARE THE GASOLINE, CIGARETTE, AND SALES TAXES
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
JoHN B. SEoLLEY
The revenue system of this state is based in large part upon three
taxes: sales tax, gasoline tax, and cigarette tax. These three taxes re-
spectively produce about $15,000,000, $16,000,000 and $2,000,000 per
annum, or a total of $33,000,000, which is about 43% of the total in-
come of the state government.' The sales and cigarette taxes have been
in effect since 1935, and the present gasoline tax since 1933.
It is indeed rather surprising to discover that there is a strong possi-
bility that all three of these taxes are unconstitutional in their present
statutory forms. But this appears to be the effect of a recent decision
of the state supreme court. The case referred to, State v. Inland Empire
Refineries,2 involved the validity of a 1939 statute imposing an excise
tax of one-fourth cent per gallon upon the distribution of petroleum
products other than motor fuel, lubricants, and medicants.3 The statute
was held unconstitutional in its entirety upon three independent
grounds. First, the discrimination against vendors and users of fuel
oil and in favor of vendors and users of other fuels such as coal or
wood, etc. was held to violate the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution and the equal privileges clause of the state con-
stitution. Second, the exemptions from the tax of fuel oil sold to vessels
engaged in foreign commerce, of that sold to a gas company and used
by it to manufacture gas for distribution to the public, and of that
refined within the state, were held to violate the same constitutional
provision; and since these exemptions were deemed inseparable, the
whole statute was thereby rendered invalid. Third, the provisions re-
quiring distributors to secure a license, pay a fee, and file a surety
bond, inasmuch as they applied to distributors who imported petroleum
'Tax Commission of State of Washington, Summary of Current Rev-
enues and Expenditures for Year Ending March 31, 1940.
'3 Wn. (2d) 651, 101 P. (2d) 975 (1940).
'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 186; Rw. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 8370-78a to
8370-80t. The act is entitled "Fuel Oil Tax" and it will usually be so desig-
nated in this paper.
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products into the state and those who purchased from such importers,
were held to impose an improper burden upon interstate commerce in
contravention of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
A dissent was filed by Chief Justice Blake, in which Mr. Justice
Main concurred, in which he caustically declared that only one ground
of attack upon the statute had a "semblance of validity," i. e., the
exemption of locally refined fuel oil; and he took the position that this
exemption could be properly held inoperative under the broad sever-
ability clause in the statute.
Since the court has denied a petition for rehearing, 4 it appears that
the fate of the fuel oil tax is settled for the time being. It is the purpose
of this article to examine the implications of this decision upon other
tax statutes.
At the outset, one is confronted with the knotty problem of attempt-
ing to assay the importance of each of the three grounds of decision.
Several alternatives are possible. Each ground might have been regarded
as sufficient in itself to support the holding. But if so, why did not the
court content itself with a reliance upon that one ground which seemed
to it least open to doubt? Why unnecessarily decide important consti-
tutional questions? A few years ago Chief Justice Hughes in dissent
criticized his colleagues of the majority for doing just this.5
Again, it may be that the court was in so much doubt about each
of the grounds that it felt it necessary to accumulate them to overcome
the presumptions of constitutionality. If so, a statute suffering from
only one--or possibly two--of the defects found in the fuel oil tax act
might well be upheld. But this hypothesis would run counter to the
proposition that courts should not wink at small violations of a consti-
tution, for to do so would permit the legislature to whittle away con-
stitutional guarantees little by little.'
Finally, two of the three grounds of decision might be deemed dicta
unnecessary to the holding. But which two? That question could not
be answered until the court is called upon in the future to decide a case
similar to the fuel oil tax case in respect to one of the defects relied
upon in the latter. It would then be free to depart from the ruling in
that case on the ground that it was merely dictum. The United States
A petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed in the United States
Supreme Court [ (1936) 9 U. S. L. Week 30831 but the presence of a non-
federal ground of decision makes its granting doubtful.
I Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 374-5 (1935).
Three weeks later, however, the Chief Justice himself was guilty of the
same fault in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
8See 11 Am . JuR., Const. Law, §§ 88, 89, 95, for authorities in support of
this proposition.
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Supreme Court did just this in the Wagner Act cases.7 When counsel
relied on the Guffey Act cases" in support of their contention that the
Wagner Act was being applied to situations beyond the reach of Con-
gress' power to regulate interstate commerce, Chief Justice Hughes
pointed out that the earlier decision had also been based upon a
finding of improper delegation of legislative power and a violation of
the due process clause.9
Thus the effect of a decision based upon multiple constitutional
grounds must remain uncertain, and yet it cannot safely be disregarded.
Hence throughout the following discussion it will be assumed that each
of the three defects discovered in the fuel oil tax act was regarded by
the court as in itself a sufficient basis for the decision that the act was
unconstitutional in its entirety.
THE GASOLINE TAX AND THE COMMMRCE CLAUSE
The gasoline tax act of 1933,10 which is that presently in effect, and
the fuel oil tax act of 1939, 1 which was held unconstitutional in State
v. Inland Empire Refineries, are strikingly similar in their provisions.
Each lays an excise tax upon the "distributor" for each gallon of the
respective petroleum products sold, distributed or used within the
state.12 "Distributor" is defined in essentially the same way.'8 Under,
each statute a distributor must procure a license upon the payment of
a filing fee of ten dollars, the filing of an application and the posting
of a substantial bond to secure the payment of taxes and penalties to
the state.1 4 Each distributor is required to report the extent of his
taxable transactions each month, and his default results in the addition
of a 10%o penalty to his tax for such period.' 5 Acting as a distributor
without obtaining a license is made "unlawful"' 6 and results in the
addition of a 100%o penalty to the tax.'1 Violation of any provision of
'National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1 (1937).8 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
8301 U. S. 1, 41. For a criticism of Chief Justice Hughes for adopting
this method of dealing with awkward precedents, see the dissenting opin-
ion in Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U. S. 453 (1938).
10 Wash. Laws 1933, c. 58, as amended by Wash. Laws 1939, c. 177; REM.
REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 8327-1 to 8327-27.
U"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 186; REw. RPv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 8370-78a to
8370-80t.
"= Gasoline tax, Rmv. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8327-5; fuel oil tax, REM.
REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-78a.
"The term includes a refiner or importer who sells or uses, etc., and
anyone else who acquires a product in this state upon which no tax has
been paid. Gasoline tax, REm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 8327-1 (c), 8327-5a;
fuel oil tax, Rmv. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-79a (a).
1, Gasoline tax, RPar. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8327-2; fuel oil tax" RMVE
REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) 8370-80a. These two sections and the pairs cited in
the next five notes are almost identical. In each the gasoline tax act is
cited first.
1I Pmiv REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8327-7; id. § 8370-80d.
"Id. § 8327-3; id. § 8370-80b.
17 Id. § 8327-8; id. § 8370-80e.
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each act is ground for revocation of license'8 and is made a gross mis-
demeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $500 or imprisonment,
or both.'9 In short, for all essential purposes relevant to the commerce
clause restriction upon state legislative power, the two statutes are
identical.
If the fuel oil tax statute violates the constitutional immunity of
interstate traders in petroleum products, then the gasoline tax act
does the same thing to those same traders. A judicial declaration that
by necessary implication brands one of the chief sources of state revenue
for the past seven years as an illegal exaction is of sufficient importance
to warrant critical examination.
On this point the majority opinion of the court, delivered by Mr.
Justice Millard, is so brief that it can be quoted in full:
"Chapter 186, Laws of 1939, imposes a tax upon any per-
son who acquires within the state petroleum products from
any person importing same into the state, and upon any person
who imports into the state and withdraws, sells, distributes,
or in any manner uses the products within this state. The
statute further requires such persons to pay a fee, file a surety
bond, obtain a license, etc., as distributors. Those conditions
constitute an unlawful burden on interstate commerce, hence
unconstitutional. ' 20 [Citing Cases]
This passage is puzzling. Surely the court did not mean to declare
that the imposition of a tax upon the distribution or use of imported
petroleum products is an unconstitutional burden upon interstate com-
merce, because the first case cited 2 squarely held that such a tax is
not a forbidden burden, a holding that has been many times re-
affirmed. 22 Yet, if the passage quoted be taken to refer solely to the
licensing and bonding provisions of the taxing statute, its relevance
is not clearly apparent, for the principal case was an action by the state
to recover the tax, not an action to punish the defendant for, or re-
strain him from, operating without a license.
22
1Id. § 8327-14; id. § 8370-80k.
'Id. § 8327-19; id. § 8370-80n.
"3 Wn. (2d) 651, 663 (1940).
'Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921).
"The authorities in support of the type of tax involved are very num-
erous. Sonneborn Bros. v. Keeling, 262 U. S. 506 (1923) (upholding tax on
sale in original package by importer); Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wal-
lace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933) (upholding tax on importer's withdrawal from
storage for use in operating train in interstate commerce); Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937) (upholding tax on use of imported
article by importer); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309
U. S. 33 (1940) (upholding sales tax on goods delivered to buyer in state
from seller's place of business outside state).
"The two companion cases, Great Northern R. Co. v. Cohn, 3 Wn. (2d)
672, 101 P. (2d) 985 (1940), and Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Cohn, 3 Wn.
(2d) 730, 101 P. (2d) 984 (1940) were actions to secure declaratory judg-
ments, inter alia, that the entire fuel oil tax statute was unconstitutional.
In neither was there an attack on the licensing provisions as such.
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There are two possible explanations for the inclusion of the quoted
paragraph in the opinion. The first is that it is a dictum inserted as a
warning to the state administration not to seek to enforce the licensing
provisions of the gasoline tax act, and an invitation to taxpayers to
resist such enforcement. This explanation accuses the court of violating
one of the basic canons of judicial technique in constitutional litiga-
tion; i. e., that a court will pass upon constitutional questions only
when absolutely necessary.24 The second explanation implies a some-
what less flagrant violation of the same canon; it is that the court
regarded the invalidity of the licensing provisions as an additional
ground for holding the tax unconstitutional. If so, the unexpressed
link in the reasoning of the court must be the conclusion that the
licensing provisions of the statute cannot be severed from the taxing
provisions, and that both must stand or fall together.
Now this implied conclusion is of doubtful soundness. In the Bowman
case 2 5 itself, the United States Supreme Court, although it held some-
what similar licensing provisions invalid and enjoined their enforce-
ment, refused to enjoin the collection of the tax upon intrastate sales
and uses of gasoline, holding that the statute was separable in this
respect. Although it is true that that decision is not controlling upon
a state court construing a similar state statute, 26 it is at least per-
suasive; and it would seem that the Washington court might well have
set forth the reasons why it was not followed, particularly in view of
the strongly worded severability clause in the fuel oil tax statute.2 7
Furthermore, earlier decisions of the Washington court itself are in-
consistent with the result tacitly reached in the instant case. Thus in
State v. McFarland,28 the court, in considering the validity of a statute
providing for the inspection of hotels, declared that the act as a whole
would not fall because of the presence of a provision imposing un-
constitutional methods for the collection of inspection fees. In Northern
Cedar Co. v. French, the court refused to enjoin the enforcement of
a statute providing for the licensing and regulation of commission mer-
chants although the provisions in respect to the revocation of licenses
.4 See 16 C. J. S. 207-216 for an extensive citation of authorities. In State
ex rel. Great Northern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 52 Wash. 17, 33, 100
Pac. 179 (1909), the court refused to consider the constitutionality of
statutory provisions which were not directly involved in the facts of the
case.
Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921).
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 (1924).
TR m. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-80s. The clause is quoted below
at p. 235. The gasoline tax act contains the following severability clause:
"If any section, part or provision of this act shall-be adjudged to be invalid
or unconstitutional such adjudication shall not affect the validity of the
act as a whole, or any section, provision or part thereof not adjudged in-
valid or unconstitutional." Rm. P~v. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8327-24.
60 Wash. 98, 110 Pac. 792, 140 A. S. R. 909 (1910).
131 Wash. 394, 230 Pac. 837 (1924).
1940]
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were found to be unconstitutional. The court phrased the rule as to
severability of statutes as follows: "An entire act will fall only where
the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions are so connected and
interdependent in subject-matter, meaning and purpose that it cannot
be believed that the legislature would have passed the one without the
other, or where the part eliminated is so intimatley connected with the
balance of the act as to make it useless to accomplish any of the pur-
poses of the legislature.1 30 Surely it cannot be said that the licensing
provisions in the fuel oil tax statute are so necessary that this test is
met. Yet the supreme court has spoken and its last word is the law,
and presumably, will be the law. Therefore, the licensing provisions of
the gasoline tax act of 1933 are not severable, and the whole statute
must fall.
But let not gasoline distributors rush gleefully into court to reap the
fruits of Inland Empire Refineries case; but rather pause and consider,
for the United States Supreme Court has the last word in all matters
pertaining to the United States Constitution, and it would most cer-
tainly be called upon to speak were the state supreme court to apply
its ruling in the fuel oil tax case to the gasoline tax. Not long ago,
the supreme court of this state was reversed for a too zealous protection
of interstate commerce from state regulation.3 1
What then would be the attitude of the United States Supreme
Court toward the licensing provisions of the gasoline tax statute? A
resort to past decisions does not reveal a clear cut answer, but the
general tenor of the cases points definitely to the prediction that those
provisions would be held valid.
Turning first to the authorities relied upon in the Inland Empire Re-
fineries case in the passage quoted above, it will be found that only
the first three are at all in point. The Gwin, White & Prince32 and
Paramount Pictures3 3 cases held that excise taxes measured by gross
receipts from transactions in interstate commerce were invalid. The
Western Union34 case held invalid an annual corporate franchise tax
measured by total assets within and without the taxing state. The
Graves33 case held invalid an excise tax upon gasoline withdrawn from
'Old. at 415. See also to much the same effect State v. Walker, 48 Wash. 8,
92 Pac. 775, 15 Ann. Cas. 257 (1907); State v. Bonham, 93 Wash. 489, 161 Pac.
377 (1916). It is to be noted that the problem here under discussion is quite
different from that presented by an invalid exemption in a taxing statute.
As to the latter see p. 231 below.
= Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1 (1937), reversing State ex rel. Foss
Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 186 Wash. 589, 59 P. (2d) 373 (1936), which latter case
had held a state statute providing for the inspection and regulation of small
vessels invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce.
, Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939).
13Paramount Pictures Distributing Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 376, 51
P. (2d) 385 (1935).
3 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1910).
' Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 (1936).
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storage for the purpose of delivery to an instrumentality of the United
States. It is true that the first three cases cited 8 each held invalid
statutes licensing persons engaged in interstate commerce, but in each
case the license was conditioned upon the payment of an annual license
fee imposed for revenue or prohibitive purposes. It was the exaction of
the fee that was deemed the improper burden upon interstate commerce.
The question involved in these three cases is readily distinguishable
from that raised by the fuel oil and gasoline tax statutes. The fee im-
posed by the latter two is a ten dollar "filing fee" to be paid at the
time of application for a license. It is obviously not great enough to
cover the cost of administering the licensing provisions of the acts, and
would seem to fall within that class of "inspection fees" which may
properly be imposed upon persons engaged in interstate commerce. 3
In any event, it is unthinkable that a court would regard such a petty
requirement as so essential to the whole statute that it could not be
severed.
The decision of the Washington court then is supported by none
of the cases expressly relied upon. If it is sustainable at all, it must
be upon the ground that the bonding and penalty provisions of the
fuel oil tax statute-which, as has been pointed out, are almost identi-
cal with those of the gasoline tax statute-are improper burdens to
cast upon those taxpayers who are engaged in interstate commerce. As
to the bonding requirement, some support can be found for the decision
in question in the case of Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,8 wherein a statute
licensing steamship ticket agents and requiring them to post a bond
to protect their patrons was held to impose an improper burden upon
persons engaged in foreign commerce. But the authority of this case
has been greatly weakened, if not completely destroyed, by two sub-
sequent decisions of the Supreme Court. In the first, Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Illinois,"9 a statute licensing persons selling farm
produce on commission and requiring them to post bonds to protect
their shippers was upheld despite a showing that most of the busi-
ness done was interstate in character. In the second, Milk Control Board
v. Eisenberg Farm Products,4" a statute requiring milk buyers to pay
a fixed minimum price and post a bbnd to protect the sellers was
upheld when applied to a buyer who shipped all of his milk to another
state. Under the gasoline and fuel oil tax acts the bond is for the pro-
tection of the tax claims of the state, claims which we have seen are
"Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921); State v. Yetter,
192 S. C. 1, 5 S. E. (2d) 291 (1939); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47
(1891).
"See Great Northern R. Co. v. Washington, 300 U. S. 154 (1937), for a
discussion of the validity of such fees.
273 U. S. 34 (1927).
298 U. S. 155 (1936).
"0 306 U. S. 346 (1939).
19401
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perfectly proper in themselves. If, as the Supreme Court has so recently
held, a state has the power to require interstate traders to post bonds
to protect the rights of private persons with whom they deal, it would
certainly seem to follow that a state can protect its own just claims
in the same way.
Are the penalty provisions of the gasoline and fuel oil tax statutes
so drastic that they overpass the power of a state to regulate interstate
traders? This very question, arising under similar provisions in an Iowa
gasoline tax act, was presented to the Supreme Court in Monamotor
Oil Co. v. Johnson.41 The court there found no constitutional objection
to the imposition of civil and criminal pecuniary penalties for a failure
to pay the required taxes, but it appeared to be in doubt as to the
power of the state to prohibit further transaction of interstate business
as a penalty for a tax delinquency.' 2 The latter provision was apparent-
ly regarded as severable from the rest of the statute,4 3 a conclusion
which seems inescapable there and in regard to the Washington statute
as well.
Thus the reliance upon the commerce clause as a ground of decision
in the Inland Empire Refineries case appears to have been the result
of a mistaken reading of the Supreme Court decisions, and the gasoline
tax is in all probability still valid despite the strong implication to the
contrary found in the recent opinion of the state supreme court.
THE CIGARETTE TAX AND TAX DISCRIMINATIONS AMONG
COMPETING PRODUCTS
In its search for new sources of revenue in 1935, the Washington
legislature, taking its cue from Congress, hit upon the cigarette, a
product very widely used and at the same time vulnerable because of
the hold-over of old ideas that it is a luxury, unhealthful and faintly
immoral. The original tax 4 of one cent per pack of twenty worked out
so well that it was doubled in 193 9.4 ' This tax is a comparatively heavy
one, amounting to about 11 % of the retail price, and imposes a sub-
stantial annual burden upon users. Nevertheless, its validity has ap-
parently never until now been questioned. But in light of the Inland
Empire Refineries case, the constitutionality of the cigarette tax is in
serious doubt.
" 292 U. S. 86 (1934).
'The trial court in this case had declared that the state has this power.
Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 3 F. Supp. 189 at 202 (D. C. Iowa, 1933).
13 For a similar holding in an analogous situation, see State ex rel. Great
Northern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 52 Wash. 17, 100 Pac. 179 (1909),
wherein the court upheld the validity of an order of the Commission and
refused to pass on the validity of the statutory penalties provided for its
violation.
44 Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, tit. XII.
"Wash. Laws 1939 c. 225, § 23, REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 8370-82
to 8370-95.
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As the first ground of its decision in the fuel oil tax case, the court
held that that tax violated the equal protection clause46 of the United
States Constitution and the equal privileges47 clause of the state con-
stitution. Mr. Justice Millard reasoned as follows:
"Fuel oil and solid fuels, such as coal, wood, sawdust and
coke, together with the mechanical contrivances incidental to
their use, such as oil burners, coal stokers and sawdust burn-
ers, are marketed in competition with each other... No rea-
sonable ground exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within the classification of distributors of fuel subject
to tax and distributors of fuel not subject to tax. That is, a
distributor of fuel oil is required to pay a tax of approx-
imately 11 per cent for the privilege of distributing fuel oil,
while there is no comparable tax upon the distributors of coal,
wood, sawdust, coke, gas and electricity. All purchasers of
fuel oil, as well as purchasers of coal, sawdust, wood and coke,
are subjected to a compensating tax for the privilege of using
in this state tangible personal property purchased at retail
or produced or manufactured for commercial use. The result
of the imposition of the fuel oil tax and the compensating
tax is that users of fuel oil pay a tax of approximately 13 per
cent upon the fuel consumed by them, while users of the other
fuels pay only the compensating tax of 2 per cent . . . To
impose the compensating tax upon all persons in this state
for the privilege of using tangible personal property in the
state, and then to single out a particular group (users of fuel
oil) and impose an additional tax upon them for the same
privilege, is indefensible on constitutional grounds. It is vio-
lative of the rule that reasonable ground must exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within, and those ex-
cluded from, the classification for tax purposes. It is, we re-
peat, in defiance of the purpose of the privileges and immun-
ities provision of the state constitution and contravenes the
equal protection provision of the Federal Constitution.""4
These remarks could, with one qualification, be applied to the cigar-
ette tax by substituting "cigarettes" for "fuel oil" and "cigars, pipes
and tobacco" for "solid fuels." Even the percentages work out approx-
imately the same. The one possible distinction lies in the fact that
the distributors of cigarettes are in fact the distributors of the other
forms of tobacco as well. How significant this distinction is, is hard
to say. In any event, it could always be urged that wholesalers of
cigarettes compete for the consumers' dimes with wholesalers of chew-
"'No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U. S. CoNsT., Ammo. XIV, § 1.
"7 "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or
corporation, other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon
the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations."
WAsm CoNsT., ART. I, § 12.
"8 3 Wn. (2d) 651, 657.
1940]
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ing gum and candy. Who can say whether this competition is more
or less real than that between liquid and solid fuel dealers? Who
knows how many former cigarette smokers have, since 1935 or 1939,
shifted to confectionery as a more economical avenue to nervous relax-
ation? To base the validity of a revenue classification upon the
absence of competition is to invite dispute, confusion and uncertainty.
Furthermore, it will be noticed that the court put greater stress
upon the discrimination among fuel users and apparently regarded
this as the truly fatal defect in the statute. If so, the discrimination
among tobacco users should be equally fatal to the cigarette tax.
Indeed, it is more difficult to justify the latter discrimination than the
former. Thus fuel oil users, by and large, are no doubt more affluent
than the users of other fuels, hence better able to bear the burden
of the tax; but just the reverse relation probably exists as between
cigarette and cigar users.
No further example is needed to point out the very serious effect
upon the state treasury if the rule applied in the Inland Empire Re-
fineries case were invoked against other revenue statutes; and, if this
decision represents a proper interpretation of the equal protection
clause, similar disasters might befall the treasuries of all other states
as well.
The danger of foreign repercussions is very remote, however, since
it is almost inconceivable that the United States Supreme Court would
subscribe to the interpretation placed on the Federal Constitution by
the Washington court.49 The former court has passed on similar cases
and similar arguments on several occasions, and has invariably held
that a tax classification based on physical differences between the
articles taxed and those exempted does not deny the equal protection
of the laws, whether or not such articles are sold in competition with
each other.
In Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas,50 the Court upheld a special occu-
pation tax upon wholesale dealers in petroleum products amounting
to 2 per cent of the value of such products handled. No similar tax
was levied on wholesalers of other goods. Thus the case is a strong
authority in support of the type of statute held invalid in the Inland
Empire case.
" The relevant decisions of the Supreme Court are discussed in Sholley,
Equal Protection in Tax Legislation (1938) 24 VA. L. 1 Ev. 229, 388, (1938) 5
Sel. Essays Const. Law 39. The present attitude of the Court is that "the
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most ex-
plicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive dis-
crimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the
one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83 (1940).
w217 U. S. 114 (1910).
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The leading case on the point is Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.,"'
decided in 1922. A Pennsylvania statute imposed an excise tax upon
the business of preparing anthracite coal for market equal to 132 per
cent of the value of the coal so prepared. No comparable burden was
placed upon the competing producers of bituminous coal, and the tax
was attacked under the equal protection clause because of this dis-
crimination. This contention was answered by the Court as follows:
"The fact of competition may be accepted. Both coals,
being compositions of carbon, are, of course, capable of com-
bustion and may be used as fuel, but under different conditions
and manifestations; and the difference determines a choice
between them even as fuels. By disregarding that difference
and the greater ones which exist, and by dwelling on com-
petition alone, it is easy to erect an argument of strength
against the taxation of one and not of the other. But this may
not be done. The differences between them are a just basis
for their different classification; and the differences are great
and important. They differ even as fuels; they differ funda-
mentally in other particulars. Anthracite coal has no substan-
tial use beyond a fuel; bituminous coal has other uses. Prod-
ucts of utility are obtained from it.,* ** They are, therefore,
incentives to industries that the State in natural policy might
well hesitate to obstruct or burden.1 52
The pertinence of these remarks to the fuel oil tax statute is obvious.
The Washington court, in stressing the fact of competition and ex-
cluding other considerations, did what the Supreme Court said "may
not be done."
The rule of the Heisler case has never been questioned, and since
its decision, the validity of a tax classification based upon a physical
difference has been taken for granted. Thus in 1934, in a case involving
a Washington statute imposing a special sales tax of fifteen cents per
pound on butter substitutes, 3 the validity of the discrimination in
favor of butter and against oleomargarine was said to be so "obvious"
that the point was not further discussed.5 4
Moreover, the Supreme Court has many times sustained tax dis-
criminations even among competing dealers in the same products where
a difference in the methods of doing business, or in the ultimate aini
of the enterprise, can be found. The best-known examples of the
former group of cases are those sustaining the very heavy taxation
of chain, stores; 5 and a good example of the latter is the decision up-
"' 260 U. S. 245 (1922).
"Id. at 256-7.
53samL R v. STAT. § 8358-2.
"A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40,. 43 (1934).
'sState Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931);
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea,
Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937). See Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores
v. Henneford, 187 Wash. 472, 60 P. (2d) 86 (1936) for a similar holding.
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holding a Seattle ordinance imposing an occupation tax upon privately
owned electric utilities while exempting a vigorously competitive
municipally owned electric power enterprise. 6 Thus it is clear that
in the view of the United States Supreme Court a tax legislature has
great latitude in the matter of classification for tax purposes, a latitude
which is not curtailed by the presence of competition between those
taxed and those exempted; and it is equally clear that the Washington
court fell into error in holding that the equal protection clause
forbade the discrimination among fuel dealers and users resulting
from the fuel oil tax.
But it will be recalled that the holding on this point in the Inland
Empire case was also based upon a violation of the equal privileges
clause of the state constitution, a ruling not subject to review by the
United States Supreme Court, since the highest court in a state has
the last word on the interpretation of that state's constitution. Does
this reliance on the state constitution mean that the decision is based
upon an independent and alternative ground which is not bound up in
the-to put it mildly-very questionable interpretation of the equal
protection clause? Or does the court mean that the privileges and
immunities clause of the state constitution is violated because the
equal protection clause is violated?
The fact that the two clauses are coupled together throughout the
opinion points to the second hypothesis. As the court said in the
course of its opinion upholding the gasoline tax of 1921 against an
attack based upon the same two constitutional provisions, "We have not
deemed it necessary to discuss separately appellant's claims of right
under the state and Federal constitutions, being of the opinion that
the reason and the result to be reached would necessarily be the same,
in view of the manifest identity in substance of the rights guaranteed
by the respective provisions thereof."57 The adherence to this view by
the Washington court is shown by its custom in recent cases involving
both clauses, of relying as authority upon its own decisions, those of
the United States Supreme Court, and those of other state courts,
rather indiscriminately."' If this hypothesis as to the court's attitude
Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619 (1934).
5'State v. Hart, 125 Wash. 520, 525-6, 217 Pac. 45 (1923). See also State
v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 610, 140 Pac. 918, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 209 (1914), for a
similar statement. Mr. Justice Holcomb apparently did not agree with this
proposition. See his concurring opinion in State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187
Wash. 75, 87, 59 P. (2d) 1101 (1936).
11 See, e. g., Puget Sound Power & L. Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 668, 21 P.
(2d) 727 (1933); Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P. (2d)
363 (1934); Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P. (2d) 1016 (1935);
Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores v. Henneford, 187 Wash. 472, 60 P. (2d)
86 (1936). Contrast the approach where the clause requiring uniformity in
property taxation (WASH. CONST., AmEND. XIV) is involved. Culliton v.
Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. (2d) 81 (1933).
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turns out to be correct, the cigarette tax is in no great danger, for it
cannot be assumed that the Washington court will persist in applying
its peculiar interpretation of the equal protection clause in the face
of authoritative decisions to the contrary.
If, however, the court is prepared to strike out on a new tack and
take the position that the equal privileges clause of the state constitu-
tion imposes greater limitations upon legislative action than does the
equal protection clause, the cigarette tax is of more doubtful validity.
But even in this event that tax cannot be regarded as doomed. As
against the strong language and clear analogy of the fuel oil tax case,
there can be set up equally strong language and clear analogies in
numerous earlier Washington cases. It is true that the last word of
the supreme court is the law usually, but will the court take a second
step away from the path trod by its predecessors, a path not expressly
repudiated? Will not rather the customary potency of the doctrine of
stare decisis, reinforced in this instance by the practical necessities of
the state treasury, prevail despite a temporary aberration?
Therefore, let us turn to the prior interpretations of the equal priv-
ileges clause. Insofar as the language of the court is significant, the
prevailing attitude of the court has heretofore been that of great re-
luctance to substitute its ideas of the reasonableness of a tax classifi-
cation for those of the legislature. In 1909 the court, in passing upon
the validity of a statute exempting peddlers of certain articles from
a tax falling on other peddlers, said:
"'As to the cogency or propriety of either the regulations
made, or of the importance of the distinctions, as we have so
often said, the courts have little concern. Those subjects rest
with the legislature, and only when the court, in the exercise
of the utmost deference toward that other branch of the gov-
ernment, is compelled to say that no one in the exercise of
human reason and discretion could honestly reach a conclusion
that distinctions exist having any relation to the purpose and
policy of the legislation, can it deny its validity.'
"The legislature having exempted from the operation of
this law peddlers of agricultural and farm products, and ven-
dors of books, periodicals, and newspapers, thus placing them
in a different class from other peddlers, we do not think it
can be said that such a classification is wholly without rea-
son, and foreign to all legitimate purpose of the legislation.
Reasons quite satisfactory to some minds could be advanced
for exempting peddlers of farm products from a license law,
and the same can be said of vendors of books, periodicals, and
newspapers; while on the other hand, there may be room for
argument to the contrary. We refer to reasons and arguments
relating to some legitimate purpose of the law. The very fact
that there is room for honest difference of opinion in this re-
spect shows that it is a question of policy, and not of power
1940]
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in the legislature to pass the law." 56
In 1923 the court declared that in passing upon the validity of a
tax classification alleged to be arbitrary, "the courts will not enter upon
any very exacting inquiry."60 Ten years later in a case attacking the
validity of the business and occupation tax, the court said:
"This being an excise tax, the legislature has very broad
power, and we cannot interfere with that power except for
arbitrary action, clear abuse, or constructive fraud appear-
ing on the face of the act or from facts of which we may take
judicial knowledge.""'
Obviously, the decision in the Inland Empire Refineries case reflects
a judicial attitude inconsistent with that expressed in these passages.
Moreover, that decision is equally inconsistent with the actual holdings
in the earlier cases.
The previous decisions of the Washington court did not impose any
serious limitation upon the legislative power to classify for the purpose
of excise taxation. Cases involving regulatory statutes62 and property
taxeS6 3 will not be considered because more rigid limitations upon the
power to classify are there applied. Attention will be further confined
to cases where competition existed between those taxed and those ex-
empted, since that feature was apparently deemed controlling in the
Inland Empire case.
" McKnight v. Hodge, 55 Wash. 289, 294-5, 104 Pac. 504, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1207 (1909), per Parker, J. The quotation is from State v. Evans, 130 Wis.
381, 385, 110 N. W. 241 (1907).
'0 Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 78, 217 Pac. 502 (1923), per
Fullerton, J. The court also requoted the language from the Wisconsin
case, supra, note 59.
" State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 407, 25 P. (2d) 91 (1933),
per Tolman, J. For other statements to much the same effect, see State
ex rel. Scott v. Superior Court, 173 Wash. 547, 551, 24 P. (2d) 87 (1933), per
Main, J.; State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 80, 59 P. (2d) 1101(1936), per Steinert, J.
"The court has declared that a classification valid in a revenue measure
may be invalid in a police measure. In re Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 80 Pac. 547(1905); City of Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 98 Pac. 755, 21 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 263 (1909); Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502(1923). Cf. Pearson v. Seattle, 199 Wash. 217, 90 P. (2d) 1020 (1939). The
United States Supreme Court has taken the same position. Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S.
83 (1940). The case most strongly relied upon in the instant case, State
ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P. (2d) 1101 (1936), involved a dis-
criminatory regulation. A statute of 1935 forbade the use of gill nets in
fishing on Puget Sound by any person except one who had held a gill
netter's license in 1932 or 1933. This classification was held arbitrary.
"'The constitutional requirement that property taxes be "uniform"
(WASH. CONST., AMEND. XIV) is held to limit rather narrowly the legisla-
tive power to classify. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P. (2d) 81 (1933);
Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P. (2d) 607 (1936). The distinction
made in the text above is emphasized in State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174
Wash. 402, 25 P. (2d) 91 (1933); Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash.72, 34 P. (2d) 363 (1934); and Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.
(2d) 1016 (1935).
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Differences in the methods employed in selling the same article
have, with a single exception, been hold proper bases for classification.
Thus peddlers can be subjected to special taxes not falling on other
merchants,"+ and similarly as to auctioneers,8 5 operators of "medicine
shows", 8 and merchants using trading stamps as an inducement to
custom.6 7 The exception mentioned, Seattle v. Dencker18 is a decision
that a city ordinance imposing a license fee upon automatic vending
machines violated the equal privileges clause of the state constitution.
Apparently the court took the position that a tax classification between
persons selling the same article can be sustained only by a showing
that the activities of the burdened group are somehow inimical to the
public welfare, and thus subject to special regulation or prohibition.
As we have seen, this view is inconsistent with the position of the
United States Supreme Court and with later decisions of the court
of this state.
In 1936 the Washington court held, in Benjamin Franklin Thrift
Stores v. Henneford,9 that an occupation tax could be levied upon
the operation of a warehouse serving a "group" of retail stores under
the same ownership, although no tax was laid upon the operation of
a warehouse to serve a single store. It was held, following the lead of
the United States Supreme Court,70 that the differences in the method
of conducting the business justified the separate classification of chain
stores. There was no discussion whatever of the harmful effect, if any,
of chain stores.71
'The only prior case other than that of Dencker which held an ex-
cise tax invalid because of its discrimination between competing busi-
ness enterprises was Aberdeen Savings & Loan Association v. Chase,7 2
wherein it was held that a special net income tax cannot be levied
upon private banking corporations where they are in competition with
untaxed individuals and partnerships. The authority of this case on
the question under discussion has been weakened by two later decisions,
64 In re Garfinkle, 37 Wash. 650, 80 Pac. 188 (1905); McKnight v. Hodge,
55 Wash. 289, 104 Pac. 504, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1207 (1909); Town of Sumner
v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923).
Stull v. DeMattos, 23 Wash. 71, 62 Pac. 451 (1900).
Walla Walla v. Ferdon, 21 Wash. 308, 57 Pac. 796 (1899).
e= Fleetwood v. Reed, 21 Wash. 547, 58 Pac. 665, 47 L. R. A. 205 (1899);
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Tacoma, 68 Wash. 254, 122 Pac. 1060 (1912);
State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 140 Pac. 918, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 209 (1914)
(prohibitory fee), aff'd. 240 U. S. 387 (1916).
Gs 58 Wash. 501, 108 Pac. 1086, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 446 (1910).
1 187 Wash. 472, 60 P. (2d) 86 (1936).
1o See the cases cited in note 55 supra.
The Dencker case was expressly distinguished, and inferentially ques-
tioned, in Austin v. Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P. (2d) 646 (1934).
72 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac. 536, 290 Pac. 697, 71 A. L. R. 232 (1930). This
decision was based upon the equal protection clause, following Quaker City
Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389 (1928).
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however. In Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle,73 a special
gross receipts tax upon a private electric power corporation was upheld
despite the exemption of a directly competing publicly owned cor-
poration. And in Petroleum Navigation Co. v. Henneford, 7  holding
invalid a general net income tax upon all private corporations on the
ground that it violated the uniformity requirement in respect to
property taxes, the court cited the Aberdeen case as a controlling de-
cision, which indicates that the tax held invalid in the earlier case
would today be classified as a property rather than an excise tax. If
so, the Aberdeen case would lend little support to an attack upon an
excise tax such as the fuel oil or cigarette tax. In any event, both the
Dencker and Aberdeen cases are readily distinguishable from a case
involving a classification based upon a physical difference in the article
sold.
Until the instant case, the Washington court had never held invalid
a tax classification based upon differences in the article sold or serv-
ices rendered. Peddlers can be classified according to the goods they
sell.7 5 A special tax can be laid upon operators of "jitney busses" not
levied upon competing transportation services.7 6 A classification drawn
between persons making chattel or salary loans and commercial bank-
ers is valid.
7 7
A statutory classification closely analogous to that arising from
the fuel oil tax statute was before the court in Morrow v. Henneford. 8
This case was an attack upon the validity of the general sales tax act
of 1935,19 and one of the grounds was the contention that the exemp-
tion of sales of milk, raw fruits and vegetables,8 0 etc., violated the equal
protection and equal privileges clauses. The court evidently did not
regard this as a very weighty contention as it deemed it a sufficient
answer merely to quote the following general language of the
Supreme Court:
"'A very wide discretion must be conceded to the legisla-
tive power of the State in the classification of trades, callings,
businesses or occupations which may be subjected to special
forms of regulation or taxation through an excise or license
tax. If the selection or classification is neither capricious nor
arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of dif-
,3172 Wash. 668, 21 P. (2d) 727 (1933), aff'd., 291 U. S. 619 (1934).
74 185 Wash. 495, 55 P. (2d) 1056 (1936).
"McKnight v. Hodge, 55 Wash. 289, 104 Pac. 504, 40 L. R. A. (N. s.)
1207 (1909) (peddlers of farm products, books, newspapers, and periodicals
exempt); Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923)
(peddlers of specified household articles taxed).
"Allen v. Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18 (1917).
"Austin v. Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P. (2d) 646 (1934.)
"'182 Wash. 625, 47 P. (2d) 1016 (1935).
"Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, tit. III.
80 Id. § 19 (g).
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ference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of
the law'.""'
If a tax discrimination against the producers, vendors, and users of
canned milk, fruit, and vegetables is valid, why is not a similar dis-
crimination in respect to fuel oil? The opinion in the Inland Empire
Refineries case does not tell us; it simply ignores all prior decisions
which would be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. The only case
cited in support of the holding on the point under consideration is
Pearson v. Seattle,8 2 decided in 1939. But this case does not support
the proposition for which it is cited, and is readily distinguishable
from the cases discussed above. It involved a municipal ordinance im-
posing an annual license fee upon dealers in solid fuels which returned
a sum greatly in excess of the cost of inspection. Because the ordinance
recited that it was a police measure, the court refused to treat it as a
revenue measure and applied the stricter rules in respect to permissible
classifications. 8 The opinion intimates that if it had been labelled as a
tax, the ordinance would have been upheld despite the discrimination
in favor of liquid fuel dealers.
The present standing as authority of Morrow v. Henneford and
the other cases upholding tax classifications is .in doubt. Presumably,
the court did not intend to overrule them, yet many of them cannot
be reconciled with the decision in the fuel oil tax case. Would a cigarette
dealer be well-advised to resist collection of the state cigarette tax?
The last opinion of the supreme court indicates that he would, but
one has a strong feeling that if the case came before it, the court would
re-discover those older cases as precedents to support the cigarette tax.
The existence in good standing of inconsistent precedents may be very
confusing to legislators and attorneys, but it must often be a comfort
to judges.
TnE SALES TAX AND THE FATAL EFFECT OF INvALID EXEMPTIONS
IN A TAX STATUTE
As we have seen, the sales tax act of 1935 exempted certain articles
from its provisions.' Many of the exemptions were abolished in 1939,85
but that protecting newspapers was retained.8 6 The loss of revenue re-
sulting from this legislative generosity cannot be great; and whether
the sale of newspapers is to be taxed or not would seem to be a matter
81 182 Wash. 625, 47 P. (2d) 1016 (1935). The quotation is from Brown-
Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910).
199 Wash. 217, 90 P. (2d) 1020 (1939). Justices Main, Blake, and Ger-
aghty dissented.
1 See note 62 supra. The court cited and quoted from the first two cases
there cited.
"
1Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, tit. Il, § 19.
','Wash. Laws 1939, c. 225, § 9. The act as amended appears in RmM.
1Ev. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 8370-16 to 8370-30.
I 4 REm., 1Ev. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-19 (c).
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of no vital concern to anyone, except possibly their publishers. Yet
a fairly plausible argument can be built upon the Inland Empire Re-
fineries case to the effect that this single exemption invalidates the
entire sales tax.
As a third ground for holding the fuel oil tax unconstitutional, the
court relied upon the presence of three invalid and inseparable ex-
emptions to that tax. These were the sale of petroleum products re-
fined in this state, the sale of fuel oil to vessels engaged in foreign
commerce, and the sale of such oil as was converted into illuminating
gas by a public service company distributing the latter product to the
public.8 7
First, let us consider the reasoning which led the court to hold that
each of these exemptions was unconstitutional. As to the one first men-
tioned, there was no serious contention to the contrary. 8 8 It has long
been well settled that a state cannot impose a discriminatory tax upon
the sale of imported goods as such,89 and, of course, the exemption of
goods produced within the taxing state has precisely the same effect,
and is equally within the implied prohibition of the commerce clause.
On this point the conclusion of the court is not open to question.
The second exemption was held invalid on the grounds that there
was no reasonable basis for discrimination between foreign carriers
by water and foreign carriers by rail and highway, and that the com-
merce clause forbids such discriminations. The latter ground is a novel
one which appears to be unsupported by reason9" or authority," and
which can be dismissed almost as curtly as it was announced,9 2 for
this is a point on which the United States Supreme Court has jurisdic-
R RE. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-80m.
The principal case was an action by the state to collect the tax from a
domestic refinery. The state contended that the exemption was invalid,
hence ineffective, and that the general taxing provision applied.
XVelton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876) ; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S.
446 (1886); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U. S. 375 (1939).
" A little reflection will disclose the practical undesirability of the an-
nounced constitutional rule, for its adoption would to a great extent destroy
all legislative power of classification. For example, the special tax on oleo-
margarine (see note 54 supra) would be invalid because of the discrimina-
tory effect upon extrastate producers of oleomargarine as compared with
extrastate producers of butter, and the exemption of newspapers from the
sales tax mentioned above would fall because of the discrimination against
extrastate publishers of magazines in favor of extrastate publishers of
newspapers.
91 On this point the court merely cites a group of Supreme Court cases,
most of which declare that a state cannot discriminate against any form of
foreign or interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce, and none
of which supports the proposition for which it was cited.
92 The opinion on this point is as follows: "By that exemption sub-
division, our legislature attempted to grant a special privilege to foreign
commerce by vessel and denied a like privilege to foreign commerce by
railroad, by motor carrier, or by other conveyance. States have no such
powers respecting interstate commerce." 3 Wn. (2d) 651, 659.
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tion to prevent its future application, at least as the sole basis of decision.
The former ground is supported by a dogmatic statement that the
classification of carriers is without a reasonable basis and the citation
of three Washington cases9 3 presumably in support of the unquestioned
rule that an arbitrary and unreasonable classification is forbidden by
the equal protection and equal privileges clauses.
We must, however, dig a little deeper in order to ascertain, insofar
as we can, the effect of this decision upon the validity of the exemp-
tion of newspapers from the sales tax. What "reasons" could the court
see to justify the latter exemption that could not be seen in the case
of the foreign carriers by vessel? It is difficult to discover any. If it
be said that the distribution of newspapers may and should be pro-
moted so that the citizenry will be informed on current affairs, it
might also be said that the promotion of the flow of foreign commerce
through the ports of 'this state will be conducive to the general welfare.14
If the reply be that all foreign commerce was not being favored by the
fuel oil tax exemption, it might equally be urged that all periodicals of
news and opinion are not exempted from the sales tax, since the sale of
magazines is taxed.
Furthermore, there is a cogent practical reason for limiting the fuel
oil tax exemption to vessels engaged in foreign commerce. The opera-
tors of such vessels are in a position to avoid the tax by fueling out-
side the state, whereas the operators of locomotives and trucks, vehicles
of more limited fuel storage capacity, cannot entirely escape, nor can
the operators of vessels engaged in domestic commerce.95 Very prob-
ably, then, the legislature believed that this exemption would lose little
revenue to the state and might prevent a serious loss of business by
local fuel oil merchants. The Supreme Court has found considerations of
this nature to be reasonable. 96
1 State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P. (2d) 1101 (1936);
Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 34 P. (2d) 363 (1934); State v.
Hart, 125 Wash. 520, 217 Pac. 45 (1923). The latter two cases upheld tax
classifications; as to the first case, see note 62 supra.
*1 That such reasons will justify exemptions from taxation, see American
Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900) (exemption of planters
from tax on sugar refiners); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S.
32 (1928) (exemption of mortgages held by building and loan associations
from recordation tax); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Serv-
ice Commission, 295 U. S. 285 (1935) (exemption of carriers of farm produce
owned by the producers from motor carriers license fee).
The failure to exempt vessels engaged in interstate cominerce cannot
be so readily explained. The court made no point of this, however, probably
because the complainant was a railroad company engaged in foreign
commerce.
"See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937) (up-
holding exemption of employers of seven or less from unemployment com-
pensation tax); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83 (1940) (upholding prop-
erty tax on deposits in extrastate banks at five times the rate of tax on
those in banks within state).
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As to the third exemption in the fuel oil tax statute, that applying
to oil sold to gas companies, the court was somewhat more explicit and
considerably more vehement.9" The vice was declared to be the dis-
crimination against other public utility companies, which, as the court
pointed out, transformed oil into electrical energy, "transportation,"
etc., just as gas companies transformed oil into gas. Apparently, the
court was impressed with the fact that the legislature had segregated
public service businesses apart from other businesses and had imposed
an occupation tax upon them in a separate title of the revenue act of
1935 ;98 thus the legislature itself had defined the "class" and all within
it must be treated alike in respect to taxation. One wonders if the
court was aware that it was condemning the aforesaid occupation tax
itself, for that act taxes gas companies at two per cent of gross receipts,
and electric power companies at three per cent,99 an inequality fully
as "glaring" as that in the fuel oil tax act.
As we have seen, the court's position on this point is out of line
with all federal and most state authorities, since the businesses of
furnishing gas and electricity are obviously different, even though com-
petitive. Nevertheless, we cannot blithely dismiss it, for it reflects the
attitude of the Washington supreme court toward such classifications
as that resulting from the exemption of newspapers from the sales tax.
The latter exemption confers the same type of special privilege upon
newspaper publishers as the fuel oil tax act conferred upon gas com-
panies. The parallel is indeed close, for the publication of newspapers,
periodicals, and magazines is treated as the same "business" in the
business and occupation tax amendments of 1937.100 How then can the
discrimination against publishers and vendors of magazines be sus-
tained? How can the fuel oil tax classification be distinguished? It can
be distinguished readily enough, but the trouble is that the distinction
points in the wrong direction.
There is a good-good at least in the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court' 1 -- reason for the exemption of gas companies from
" "The classification is so obviously, glaringly, arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable that it seems hardly necessary to do more than invoke the
equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution
and the privileges and immunities clause of our State Constitution to strike
down this extension of special privilege to one public utility and denial to
other public utilities of a like privilege of exemption." 3 Wn. (2d) 651, 661.
"Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, tit. V; REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §§ 8370-36
to 8370-43.
" REm. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-36.
'0 Wash. Laws 1937, c. 227, § 1; REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-4(f).
01 The validity of a graduated net income tax has been taken for granted.
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920). Such a tax is said to be an "equitable
method" of defraying the cost of government. New York ex rel. Cohn v.
Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 313 (1937). A graduated gross receipts tax was held
invalid, but not without a strong dissent. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis,
294 U. S. 550 (1935) (Cardozo, Stone, Brandeis, J. J., dissenting).
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the fuel oil tax which cannot be invoked in support of the exemption
of newspapers from the sales tax. Persons may be classified in accord-
ance with their respective abilities to pay without disproportionate
hardship. Thus a wealthy man may properly be called upon to pay
25% of his net income, while his neighbor of moderate income pays
only 4%, because it cannot be said that the hardship imposed thereby
upon the former is the greater. By the same token, a man of small
income may be exempted from paying any income tax at all. Now it is
almost certain that the burden of the fuel oil tax would fall more
heavily in proportion to its gross income upon a gas company than
upon an electric power company or a railroad, because a larger per-
centage of the former's total outlays are for oil. Moreover, the gas
company could pass the added cost on to the consuming public by
increasing its rates only at the risk of weakening its competitive
position. Thus an eleven per, cent increase in the cost of its oil might
well mean the difference between a reasonable profit and a loss, a pos-
sibility which would appear to be remote in respect to other public serv-
ice companies. No similar difference in relative hardship resulting from
the sales tax can be found as between the publishers of newspapers
and the publishers of magazines; the interest of the state in guarding
its citizens and business enterprises from economic distress °2 cannot
be invoked in support of the newspaper exemption.
All of this, of course, is not to be taken to mean that the exemption
of the sale of newspapers from the sales tax should be deemed uncon-
stitutional; but it is intended to show that a court following the
reasoning of the Inland Empire case would so hold.
But suppose such a result is reached, will the entire sales act be
invalidated, even in the face of a so-called severability clause in that
act? An affirmative answer is dictated by the reasoning of the court
in the Inland Empire case. Indeed, that reasoning would apply with
even greater cogency to the sales tax act, because that act cofitains a
severability clause less explicitly worded 03 than that of the fuel oil
tax statute. The clause in the latter, which is about as emphatic and
explicit a statement of legislative intention as could be devised, reads
as follows:
"If any section, sub-section, clause, sentence or phrase of
this act, including those setting forth any penalty, exemption
or definition, is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or
invalid, such decision shall not affect the validity of the re-
'2That this purpose will justify a discrimination between competitors
in the same business,-see Bordens' Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S.
251 (1936).
101 REm. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-212. This clause is to much the
same effect as that in the fuel oil tax act, except that there is no reference
to "penalty, exemption, or definition."
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maining portions of this act, and the Legislature hereby de-
clares it would have enacted this act if such section, sub-sec-
tion, clause, sentence or phrase were omitted."'0 4
In spite of this strong language, the court refused to believe that the
legislature meant what it said, and stated that if the severability clause
were obeyed the result would be contrary to the intention of the legis-
lature. This truly remarkable outcome can be explained in either of two
ways.
The court might have completely misinterpreted the motives of
the legislature in inserting the severability clause. Those motives seem
obvious enough. The fact that the fuel oil tax statute was enacted
proves that a majority of the legislature had two purposes: first, to
impose a tax upon the sale and use of fuel oil generally, and second,
Dot to impose this burden upon certain limited sales and uses. If the
legislature had stopped there, and it should transpire that the courts
interpreted the Constitution to prevent the attainment of both objec-
tivcs simultaneously, it would be open to debate whether the legislature
would prefer the one or the other. Much could be said for the propo-
sition that a court should always resolve such doubts in favor of the
individual rather than the state. But this was not such a situation.
Let us return to the legislative chambers. Suppose that certain legis-
lators foresaw the possibility that the presence of one or more of the
exemptions would render the tax vulnerable to attack on constitutional
grounds-a likely supposition in light of the very dubious validity
of the exemption of locally refined oil. Three alternatives would be avail-
able whereby the wishes of the legislature could be expressed with clar-
ity. First, if the immunity of the suggested exemptees were uppermost
in the legislative mind, the taxable class could be defined to exclude
them by omission. Second, if the legislature desired both objectives or
neither, the whole idea could be dropped. And third, if the desire to
levy the tax overrode the desire to exempt the favored group, it could
be so stated by indicating that the tax was to be imposed upon all
alike if the legislative desire to withhold it as against some could not
constitutionally be carried out. The legislature rather obviously sought
to achieve this last alternative by use of the severability clause referring
explicitly to exemptions-but without success. For the future, the legis-
lature would be well advised to make the exempting clause itself con-
ditional, e. g., "The following are exempt if their exemption will not
impair the validity of the tax herein imposed as to any other person,"
or words of similar effect.
The second explanation of the judicial disregard of the severability
clause is that the court felt constrained by the precedents, that is, that
the recognized rules as to statutory interpretation deny to courts the
10' REM. REV. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 8370-80s.
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power to extend the burdensome or restrictive provisions of a statute,
regardless of any severability clause. The difficulty with this is that
there does not seem to be any such rule. The authorities relied upon in
Mr. Justice Millard's majority opinion are not directly in point,105
whereas those cited in Chief Justice Blake's dissenting opinion, which
is devoted solely to this aspect of the case, are both more numerous
and more relevant.
The precedents in this state would seem to support the position
taken in the dissenting opinion. In two cases invalid partial exemptions
were held not to affect the validity of the rest of taxing statutes, despite
the absence of a severability clause.10 6 In several more recent cases the
court has held statutes severable in reliance upon such clauses.'
0 7
The case chiefly relied upon by the majority, Jensen v. Henneford,08
may be readily distinguished, as is made evident by the very passage
quoted. The invalid exemption found in that case, which involved the
net income tax act of 1935, was the greater credits allowed to married
persons and those having dependents. Obviously, neither the whole
credit allowed such persons nor all credits to all persons could be
stricken by the court. To do the first would create a new discrimination;
to do the latter would increase the amount of the tax laid upon all per-
sons. The only other alternative would be for the court to scale down
the credits allowed married persons to equal those allowed single per-
sons, which, said the court, would involve a rewriting of the statute, a
thing beyond the province of judges.
But in a more recent decision, Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores v.
Henneford,09 the court reached a result that amounted to a virtual re-
2w Other than the Washington income tax case which is discussed in the
text below, the opinion cited and quoted from Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44
(1922); State v. Gantz, 124 La. 535, 50 So. 524, 24 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1072 (1909);
and 11 Am. JuR. 855. The Hill case was a case wherein the court found that
the major part of a statute was invalid and refused to permit the enforce-
ment of certain valid incidental features. Its weight has been lessened by
the recent holding in Electric Bond & Share Co. v. S. E. C., 303 U. S. 419(1938), that such incidentals are severable and enforceable without regard
to the validity of the main features of the statute. The Gantz case dealt
with a statute which did not contain a severability clause. The statement
quoted from American Jurisprudence does not reflect the general tenor of
that text, which taken as a whole supports the position of the dissent. See
11 Aa . JuR. 846-9, 856.
106 Nathan v. Spokane County, 35 Wash. 26, 76 Pac. 521, 102 A. S. R. 888,
65 L. R. A. 336 (1904); State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 90
Pac. 1047 (1908). Accord: Continental Baking Co. v. Mount Vernon, 182
Wash. 68, 44 P. (2d) 821 (1935) (severability clause).
'1' State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 175, 196-7, 117
Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 466 (1911) (in case attacking validity of indus-
trial insurance act, severability clause relied on to eliminate necessity of
considering any possible violations of equal protection clause in respect to.
coverage); State ex rel. King County v. Tax Commission, 174 Wash. 336,
24 P. (2d) 1094, (1933) (act authorizing reassessment of all property in a
described class held severable and valid as to part of such property. See
also cases cited in notes 28-30 supra and text thereto.30185 Wash. 209, 53 P.(2d)607(1936). 2-187 Wash. 472, 60"P.(2d)86(1936).
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writing of the statute. The tax in question was that levied on the busi-
ness of operating a warehouse to serve chain stores, and the rate of tax
was one-half of one per cent of the value of the goods handled, which
was twice the rate of the tax on wholesale merchants. In an action to
enjoin the collection of any tax the trial court enjoined the collection
of any tax at a rate in excess of one-fourth of one per cent. This decree
was affirmed by the supreme court, which relied upon a severability
clause and upon the strong policy against crippling the revenue system
of the state. As to the latter, the court made the following statement:
"In this connection, it must always be remembered that
statutes providing for the raising of money by taxation are the
corner-stone of the legislative structure of the state. Courts
will not hold them unconstitutional and void unless such a
ruling is absolutely required. Here we have a most important
"statute providing for the raising of revenue."' 10
Apparently the majority of the court in the fuel oil tax cases were
as unmoved by these considerations of policy as they were by the weight
of the precedents in support of the classifications involved. Nevertheless,
he would be rash who would predict a judicial disregard of the sever-
ability clause were the sales tax act under constitutional attack, for
that is "a most important statute"-it produces nearly twenty times
as much revenue as did the fuel oil tax."'
To summarize our conclusions, we can say, first, that the attitude
and reasoning of the court in State v. Inland Empire Refineries, Inc., if
applied to the gasoline, cigarette, and sales tax statutes, would result
in decisions that each was unconstitutional; second, that the decision
in the Inland Empire case is out of line with all the federal precedents
and the weight of prior Washington authorities; and third, that the
probabilities are strong that the court would not follow the Inland
Empire case were the gasoline, cigarette, or sales tax statutes to be
challenged in litigation.
But as long as the case in question stands unrepudiated, it constitutes
a threat to the validity of many statutes, both taxing and regulatory,
for it is a rare statute that does not produce discriminations of one sort
or another. This threat will hamper the administration of such laws,
encourage resistance to their enforcement, and breed litigation; and it
will complicate the already difficult legislative task of devising means
of filling the state treasury. An explicit and complete repudiation of
this ill-advised decision would be a real service to the public, and one
which should not be long delayed.
',o Id. at 487, per Beals, J.
"'Tax Commission of the State of Washington, Fifth Annual Statistical
Report of the Revenue from Excise Taxes (1940) Part I, Table 2.
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